Criminal Negligence--Omission to Discharge a Legal Duty by Hall, Town
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 25 | Issue 1 Article 12
1936




Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hall, Town (1936) "Criminal Negligence--Omission to Discharge a Legal Duty," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 25 : Iss. 1 , Article 12.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol25/iss1/12
STUDENT NOTES 103
degree".- This same statute applies under the Philippine Motor Ve-
hicle Statute.
The Philippine" statute recognizes three classes of negligence which
are: 1. Reckless negligence (lack of foresight). 2. Simple negligence
(less than reckless or gross negligence). 3. Simple imprudence or neg-
ligence (punishable as a misdemeanor). An example to illustrate the
distinction between the three: A man is walking on the left side of
his horse and wagon on the right side of the street. The man, horse
and wagon approach an intersection and turn at right angles. A child
is asleep in the gutter. The man is not reckless (since he could not
foresee a child would be asleep in the gutter). It is not a pure acci-
dent (since, had he looked, he would have seen the child). He did
no unlawful act (since he, the horse and wagon were on their own
side of the street).' He is guilty, then, of simple imprudence. It
must be noted that Philippine Law is not based on the English or
American concept of law, but since its law is what it is in relation
to criminal negligence, it merits consideration to that extent.
The Hawaiian statutes contain no express definition or application
of the term criminal negligence. However, a statute provides that in
the absence of premeditated intent, the offense shall constitute sec-
ond degree murder 3
In brief summarization, the statutes herein covered were selected
with a view to the particular recognition of the elements of criminal
negligence. It is perhaps an open question as to whether a state
should have any number of statutes covering what might be termed
isolated or specific cases of criminal negligence, or one basic statute
adequately defining what shall constitute criminal negligence by and
large. The writer is inclined to the latter viewpoint on the score of
uniform treatment in harmony with administration. The Texas statute
on negligent homicide previously referred to seems to most nearly
approximate such treatment. DAviD W. CAkRTER.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE-OMISSION TO DISCHARGE A
LEGAL DUTY.
Properly speaking, criminal negligence is of two distinct types:
(1) positive or active negligence in the commission of an act and
(2) negative or passive negligence by omission to act at all. This
classification when first made was thought by the writer to be original
but upon further study it was found that substantially the same classi-
fication had been enunciated in Corpus Juris. In that work we find
these words: "A distinction is drawn in some cases between negli
gence in doing what a prudent man would not do, which is termed
"Philippine Code (Acts & Procedure), v. 1, Art. 568, p. 653.
Tbid.t Revised Stat. of Hawaii (1935), Chap. 193, Sees. 5990 and 5996.
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active or positive negligence, and the omission to do what a prudent
man would do, which is termed passive, or negative negligence."'
To those not versed in the law, perhaps no contradistinction be-
tween the two types of criminal negligence just alluded to is apparent.
But to the legal thinker, who sees more or less with an analytical
eye, a clear line of demarcation is obvious. In the first type, the de-
fendant commits the act, he is dynamic, but he fails to use due care
and the prudence of a reasonable man under the same or similar
circumstances. Here the individual accused goes forward, he does the
thing his legal duty enjoins him to do, but is guilty of positive or active
negligence in failing to measure up to required standards of care. In
the second type the defendant fails to act at all. He is static when
his legal duty enjoins him to act with due care and with the prudence
of a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances. Such
non-feasance is negative or passive negligence, and may render the
individual so failing to act guilty of a crime as will be exhibited In
succeeding paragraphs.
In connection with a discussion of criminal negligence predicated
upon omission to act, three situations present themselves: Omission
to discharge a legal duty imposed (1) by law or relationship; (2) by
contract; and (3) by the act of taking charge. In either situation the
defendant by his failure to perform such duty, or non-feasance which
results in injury or death to another person, may be held criminally
liable. One writer expresses it this way: "Every one upon whom the
law imposes any duty, or who has by contract, or by any wrongful act
taken upon himself any duty tending to the preservation of life, and
who neglects to perform that duty and thereby causes the death of a
person, or bodily harm to such person, commits the same offense as
if he had caused the same effect by an act done in the state of mind,
as to intent or otherwise, which accompanied the neglect of duty."' On
first reading, the writer's apparent meaning is that every omission to
perform a legal duty which results in injury or death to another would
result in criminality. But when we read the same author in the same
work in succeeding pages, we may deduce that such was not the mean-
ing intended to be conveyed. He makes the qualification himself, and
tells us in explicit language that negligence in the omission to per-
form a legal duty in order to constitute a crime must be culpable, and
that what is culpable negligence is a question of degree for the jury,
depending upon the circumstances of each particular case.
3
That one may be criminally liable for omitting to perform a legal
duty imposed by contract is exemplified by an Alabama case.4 Stein
was the lessee on waterworks, having contracted to supply water for
the city of Mobile. His contract bound him to supply water for the
'Negligence, 45 Corpus Juris, s. 15, pp. 638-639.
2 Stephen, Digest of Criminal Law (1877), 149.
1 Id. at 150.
'Stein v. State, 37 Ala. 123, - (1861).
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city's use from Three-Mile Creek. The contract contained no stipula-
tion as to the quality of the water to be supplied by him. It resulted
that the water so supplied under the contract was impure, and un-
wholesome. Stein was indicted, but his demurrer to the indictment
was sustained because it was not shown that he had contracted to
supply good and wholesome water. The defendant was bound under his
contract to supply only such water as was afforded by the designated
source-Three-Mile Creek. Nevertheless, the fundamental proposition
was laid down in the dictum of the case that if the defendant had
bound himself by contract to supply good and wholesome water, his
failure to perform the legal duty imposed by contract in favor of the
public would have rendered him indictable.
As a general rule the breach of a contract is not an indictable
offense. It seems to be the law that before criminality attaches be-
cause of an omission to perform a contracted duty there must be a
status created in the eyes of the law between the party injured and
the one failing to act. There must be a "helplessness" on the part of
the injured person because of the agreement. The injured person
must have been lulled into a false sense of security by the contract.
Suppose a person is a passenger on a railroad train. The person has
paid his fare, he has made a contract with the carrier, and has a
right to rely upon the carrier and its agents to look out for his safety.
In other words, his contract has made him inadvertent to possible
dangers. He is helpless, as it were, since his body is in charge of a
fast-moving train over which he has no control. There is more than a
mere contract here. There is a status; and nonfeasance in perform-
ing the duty imposed by law and by contract upon the carrier would
constitute criminal omission.5 The same result would be reached if a
person under contract bound himself to supply wholesome water to a
large city, since the contract would be an inducement to the public
to rely upon the water furnished under the terms of the contract,6
thereby creating a status, or helplessness on the part of those who
use the water.
The principle that one may be guilty of a crime if he assumes to
act, although under no duty so to do, is well embodied in an old Eng-
lish case.? The prisoner, it appears in evidence, while attending a
funeral of a Mrs. Reeves, sister of the aged Mary Warner, apparently
from magnanimity told Mrs. Warner she could come and live with
him. Mrs. Warner was 74 years old, and she replied that it was a
kind offer. Mrs. Warner went along with the prisoner. At first she
had a servant while at the prisoner's house, but as time passed this
service was discontinued. Then the prisoner would lock Mrs. 'Warner
up in her ioom, without fire, and with scant food. Later, she was not
';Cross, Criminal Non-Feasance (1931), 11 B. U. L. Rev. 273.
Stein v. State, 37 Ala. 123 (1861), cited note 4, supra.
t Regina v. Simon Marriott, 8 Car. & P. 425, 173 Eng. Rep. 559
(1838).
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permitted to get out of her room. The old lady languished and finally
died. The prisoner was indicted for murder, but was convicted for
manslaughter. In its opinion the court intimates that the prisoner
had assumed the duty of caring for the aged woman by contract, but
it is difficult to make out such from the evidence. At any rate,
whether from contract, or the voluntary act of taking charge of the
old lady, the prisoner made little attempt to provide bare necessities
for her, and his omission so to do without doubt accelerated her
death. He failed to exercise the care of a reasonably prudent man, and
was rightfully convicted for his omission in performing his legal duty.
A most peculiar case evidencing a crime by omission after once
having taken charge is that of the Queen v. Instan.8 One can hardly
imagine such a horrible state of facts. The deceased, a woman of
seventy-three, permitted the prisoner, her niece, to stay at her home.
The niece was provided for with the deceased aunt's money, and since
she had taken charge, the niece was under the legal duty to look after
the aunt in her declining days. But, during the last ten days of her
life, the deceased aunt suffered from a disease which prevented her
from moving or doing anything to procure assistance. The prisoner-
niece took in food and paid for it with deceased's money, but gave
none of it to her aunt. Neither did she procure medical attendance,
nor inform the neighbors or relatives as to her aunt's condition. Both
neighbors and relatives were nearby. While the prisoner was still
living in the house, the deceased was found much decomposed. Held:
A duty was imposed upon the prisoner under the circumstances to
supply the deceased with food in her helpless days and since the
death of the deceased was accelerated by prisoner's neglect of duty
the prisoner was properly convicted of manslaughter.
Without doubt the two cases just discussed sustain the proposi-
tion that criminal liability may result from a culpable omission to
perform a duty imposed by an implied contract, or by the voluntary
act of taking charge. The facts hardly bear out the idea that any
contract was in existence, even by implication. And it is the theory of
the writer that the most logical basis of the decisions was criminal
liability predicated upon the omission to perform a legal duty imposed
by the act of taking charge. In other words the accused assumed to
act in the premises. He omitted to exercise the care and prudence of
a reasonable man under the circumstances, and for his dereliction
was rightly adjudged guilty of culpable negligence warranting a
conviction.
This short discussion on criminal negligence based upon omission
to perform a legal duty imposed by contract and the act of taking
charge is not meant to be exhaustive. In fact these phases of criminal
negligence based upon omission to perform a legal duty are only inci-
dental to the main thesis of this paper, and are put in only for the
8The Queen v. Instan (1893), 1 Q. B. 450.
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purpose of showing that criminal negligence in such cases is an
actuality.
The rest of our time will be devoted to our main purpose-crim-
inal negligence predicated upon the omission to discharge a duty im-
posed by law or relationship. If the law requires a person to do an
act, and he, disregarding his duty, causes the death of another by his
misconduct, negligence, or lack of skill, he is guilty of involuntary
manslaughter.'
In such cases, however, there must be a legal duty as distinguished
from a moral duty to act. 0 A person may see another drowning; he
may see a decrepit old man languishing for want of food and medicine;
he may see his paramour in a paroxysm of pain because of excessive
drinking or use of morphine while in his apartment; and death may
result in each case. Yet, if there is no legal duty on his part to act,
however great and impelling the moral duty, in this modern, humane
civilization, there can be no criminality for failure to render
assistance.n
Moreover, it is not every act of negligence in the omission of a
legal duty resulting in injury to, or death of, another that will render
one guilty of a crime. Such negligence must be more than mere ordi-
nary negligence.' It must be "gross, wanton, or willful" negligence. 3
Such negligence must be culpable, and what is culpable negligence is a
question of degree for the jury, depending upon the circumstances of
each particular case." Culpable negligence, as applicable to our prob-
lem, has been more particularly defined, however, as the omission to
do something which a reasonable, prudent, and honest man would do."
A recent Oklahoma case exemplifies this definition of culpable neg-
ligence. The Oklahoma statute prescribed for and made mandatory
in mining operations the use of large fans for forcing fresh air under-
ground in diluting possible noxious gases, and in addition an under-
ground telephone system to be used in informing miners of an im-
pending danger. The legal duty of seeing that both the fan and the
telephone system were in working order devolved upon the mine super-
intendent or the person in charge. The defendant was the mine fore-
man left in charge when the catastrophe occurred. The fan ceased to
work for nearly thirty minutes, and the telephone system had become
incapacitated. When the fan was restored to working order, accumu-
lated gases were blown back where the miners were working and the
'Miller on Criminal Law (1934), 288.
"I Clark and Marshall on Crimes (3d ed.), 335.
"People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N. W. 1128 (1907);
Miller on Criminal Law (1934) 288, and cases cited in Note 52.
"State v. McComb, 33 Wyo. 346, 239 Pac. 526 (1925).
"People v. Campbell, 237 Mich. 424, 212 N. W. 97' (1927); Jones v
Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 356, 281 S. W. 164 (1926).
"1 Stephen, loc. cit. supra, note 2, at 150; People v. Seiler, 57 Cal.
App. 195, 207 Pac. 396 (1922).
"Miller, op. cit. supra, note 9, at 287.
K. L. J.-8
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lights of their lamps caused an explosion in which ten men lost their
lives. The defendant foreman in charge was indicted for manslaughter,
and in holding him guilty, the court said that because of the defend-
ant's dereliction in omitting to perform his duty, imposed upon him
by law, he omitted to do something which a reasonable, prudent and
honest man would do, and was therefore guilty of culpable negligence
and the crime of involuntary manslaughter. 6
The early view of crimes was that there were two prerequisites
to criminality: (1) an act; and (2) criminal intent. The well-known
Latin phrase Actus non facit reum nisi inens rea sit (the act does not
make the crime unless the mind is guilty) is quite expressive of those
early views. Those views are classified and accentuated in a learned
article written by Professor Sayre.'Y But this noted author tells us in
his article that the old rules have been relaxed, that intent is no
longer necessary, and that criminality may be predicated upon culpable
negligence in failing to discharge a legal duty. These views are borne
out and corroborated by the cases discussed in this paper. People v.
Pierson throws considerable light upon our problem. The d~fendant
had adopted a female child less than two years old. In January, 1901,
the child developed whooping cough, with which malady it was afflicted
until February 20. On the latter day it developed catarrhal pneu-
monia resulting in its death on February 23. The defendant testified
that for forty-eight hours preceding the child's death he noticed that
the symptoms were of a dangerous character, but that he did not send
for a physician, although financially able to do so. His reason for not
procuring a physician in his own words was that he believed in Divine
healing. The defendant was a strong believer in the Catholic Church.
He believed in disease but believed that prayer was a panacea for all
ills. It was in evidence that the defendant prayed zealously for the
child to get well. He was found guilty of a crime, although there Is
not the slightest vestige of a criminal intent. The defendant loved
his adopted child, he prayed for its life and such conduct completely
negatives the slightest intent. But because the defendant failed to
measure up to the "reasonable man" test, in omitting a legal duty
owed the infant, he was adjudged guilty of a crime.
Negligence in the omission to perform a duty imposed by law,
which is sufficient to "supply" criminal intent, is similar in charac-
ter to gross negligence in tort law, and consists in reckless or indif-
ferent omission to do what a reasonable and prudent man would do."
In crimes which consist in culpable failure to perform a duty, criminal
intent consists in the state of mind which necessarily accompanies the
culpable omission.Y Here the same author in the same work In two
succeeding pages talks of "supplied" intent and of "the state of mind
Clark v. State, 27 Okla. Cr. 11, 224 Pac. 738 (1924).
"Sayre, Mens Rea (1932), 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974.
'People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243 (1903).
2" Miller, op. cit. supra, note 9, at 66.
'0 1d. at 65.
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which necessarily accompanies the culpable omission." When one talks
of a supplied intent, he is dealing with a fiction, and it is equivalent
to no intent at all. Then the author, Miller, details five elements as
necessary in finding such intent:2 ' (1) There must be a legal duty of
'are owned upon the part of the defendant; (2) there must be a knowl-
edge upon his part of such duty, and a knowledge that there is a
present, existing danger; (3) there must be an ability on the de-
fendant's part to perform the duty owed; (4) there must be a failure
(,n the defendant's part to perform the duty; (5) it must appear that
the defendant's negligent act of omission was the cause of the injury.
In neither of these elements is there anything that amounts to intent.
Hence we may deduce that what this writer means to say is that if one
culpably fails to perform a legal duty, if he fails to exercise the care
and prudence of a reasonable man under the same or similar circum-
stances, he is guilty of a criminal omission if injury or death results,
regardless of intent. This is exactly the degree of negligence which
would render one liable in tort law, as our author intimated at the
outset.
Criminal negligence resulting from an omission to perform a duty
imposed by law encompasses three principal situations: (1) criminal
omission in the operation of locomotives, steamships and automobiles;
(2) criminal omission in practicing medicine and surgery; and
(3) crminal omission in failure of duty to dependents.- This classifi-
cation is by no means all-inclusive, but is deemed sufficient to sub-
stantiate our major premise: that one is guilty of a crime if he
culpably omits to perform a duty imposed by law.
(1) A statute provided that all steamers be equipped with suitable
life preservers and pumps. The duty imposed by law devolved upon
the owners, the captain, and officers in charge of the particular steam-
boat. The owners of a steamer provided worthless life preservers for
It, and the officers and captain failed to replace them with suitable
ones. A fire broke out, and 900 persons were drowned when obliged
to jump overboard. The passengers had been induced to rely upon
proper precautions being taken for their safety on the part of those
in charge of the steamer, and thus a status was created. The officers
in charge were adjudged guilty of criminal non-feasance in failing to
perform the duty imposed by law? Other cases of like import are in
the books.'
A legal duty devolved upon a railroad company to see that switches
were properly adjusted in order that collisions of trains and pos-
sible danger to life from derailment might be averted. The defendant
as switch tender assumed this duty, not so much by contract, as from
-Id. at 66-68.
2Note (1902) 61 L. R. A. 277.
1 United States v. Van Shaick, 134 Fed. 592 (1904).
2' United States v. Knowles, 4 Sawy. 517, 26 Fed. Cas. 800 (1864);
United States v. Thompson, 12 Fed. 245 (1882).
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his employment and position. He failed to properly adjust the
switches, and a passenger train was derailed, killing one of its pas-
sengers. The defendant was indicted for manslaughter, and was con-
victed.? He complained of an instruction to the effect that a mere
act of omission may be so criminal or culpable as to be the subject of
an indictment for manslaughter. But in sustaining the conviction the
Supreme Court of New Jersey said, "Such we believe is the prevailing
current of authority. .. The defendant in this case omitted his duty
under such circumstances as amounted to gross, or culpable, or crim-
inal negligence". Nowhere do we find mew rea. We find only an act
of omission in performing a duty enjoined by law, with a consequent
result of criminal negligence.
A recent Georgia case is quite impressive in connection with crim-
inal negligence based upon omission to perform a legal duty owed by
the owner of an automobile.? The defendant owner in his own car
was being driven by his chauffeur. The chauffeur was driving at an
excessive rate of speed, and on the wrong side of the road. A collision
with an oncoming car was the result, and a woman riding in the other
car was killed. The defendant owner was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter. In sustaining the conviction the supreme court of
Georgia said: "It would be the owner's duty when lie saw that the
law was being violated, and that his machine was being operated so as
to be dangerous to the lives and property of others on the highway,
to curb and restrain one in his employment and under his control,
and prevent him from violating the law with his own property. He
was bound to know that a car operated at such a place and in such a
manner was likely to come into collision and injure occupants of other
automobiles upon the highway. That being so, he was equally guilty
with his employee in causing the homicide." This conviction was
based upon the owner's neglect or omission to act in performing a
legal duty owed to the public in failing to see that his chauffeur drove
his car in a lawful and careful manner. The chauffeur was guilty of
positive negligence in the commission of an act, whereas the defend-
ant owner was guilty of negative negligence in omitting to act. The
books are replete with cases of like tenor?
(2) Interesting cases are found when physicians were found
guilty of a crime because of culpable negligence in the omission or
failure to perform the legal duty owed to their patientsY' The de-
fendant physician was called to treat the deceased. With the patient's
consent, he caused her to be wrapped in flannels saturated with kero-
sene, and left in that condition for three days, more or less by reason
"State v. O'Brien, 32 N. J. L. 169 (1867); State v. Harrison, 107
N. J. L. 213, 152 Atl. 867 (1931).
- Moreland v. State, 164 Ga. 467, 139 S. W. 77 (1927).
2-Ex parte Liotard, 47 Nev. 169, 217 Pac. 960 (1923); State v. Hop-
kins, 147 Wash. 198, 265 Pac. 481 (1928).2 8Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 52 Am. Rep. 264 (1884).
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of which she died. There was evidence that the defendant had made
similar application with favorable results upon previous occasions. In
one case, however, it appeared that the patient had been burned and
blistered as in the present case. The court upon indictment of the
defendant, instructed the jury (1) that it was not necessary to show
an evil intent; (2) that if by gross and reckless negligence he caused
the death, he is guilty of culpable homicide; (3) that the question
was whether the kerosene was applied as the result of foolhardy pre-
sumption or gross negligence on the part of the defendant. The de-
fendant was convicted of manslaughter. The court went on to say
that if the defendant had known the fatal tendency of the prescrip-
tion, he would have been perilously near the line of murder. Here it
is obvious that the defendant physician meant to effect a cure for his
patient. He had used the same methods on prior patients with appar-
ent success. At first blush it would seem that the defendant was guilty
of positive negligence. But upon reconsideration, the act of omission
is more salient. All in all, the defendant omitted to use the care and
prudence of a reasonable physician under the circumstances; and his
dereliction in failing to fulfill the legal duty owed to the deceased
patient rendered him guilty of negative negligence.
(3) The situations ordinarily involving criminal negligence based
upon the omission to perform a legal duty owed to dependents are the
parent-child and husband-wife relationships. In the absence of other
extrinsic and intervening circumstances, it is believed that these are
the only situations where a duty is imposed by law from mere rela-
tionship alone.? Of course the parent-child situation is meant to in-
clude step-children under the age of majority, and adopted children.
The defendants had special charge of his four-year-old stepson.
The child's feet became frozen and the defendant step-father applied
cloths saturated with vaseline. No physician was called. The de-
fendant was a fairly intelligent man, surrounded by friends and neigh-
bors who were able and willing to render any necessary assistance,
but to whom the step-father failed to mention the child's condition.
Soon the child's feet became decomposed requiring amputation. The
operation was unsuccessful and the child died. The defendant was in-
dicted for manslaughter, and the court gave an instruction to the
effect that he was guilty of gross negligence. A conviction followed.
The step-father owed the child under his care the legal duty to prd-
vide medical treatment. He was financially able, and as a reasonable
man should have foreseen what his duty was. His act of omission in
failing to measure up to the "reasonable man" test in performing this
legal duty constituted culpable negligence and a crime. Culpable omis-
sion in the discharge of the legal duty owed by a parent to a child
in providing for its care, food, nurture, sustenanc6, medical assistance,
and protection from exposure to inclement weather with a consequent
"'Note (1902) 61 L. R. A. 293-294.
" Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 139 N. W. 676 (1913).
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injury or death to the child, constitutes criminality. This proposition
is fortified by numerous decisions in other jurisdictions?'
The defendant32 and his wife had been out drinking and carousing.
On the way back home the wife became incapacitated a few paces from
their home. The weather was inclement. The wife fell prostrate upon
the icy road, and the defendant husband allowed her to remain there
the rest of the night. He rendered no assistance to her whatever,
medical or otherwise, until the next day when he and an employee
brought the benumbed wife into the house where she soon died. The
defendant husband was indicted and found guilty of manslaughter.
Here the husband stood by and omitted to discharge the legal duty
which he owed to his wife, such omission resulting in her death. It
was the duty of the husband imposed by the marital relationship to
help her to the house, and to provide food and medical assistance for
her. This duty he failed to discharge, causing the death of his wife.
His conduct was culpable, for a reasonable man under the circum-
stances would have fully performed. The defendant was rightfully
convicted. This legal principle has been sustained in other states.-
"
From the foregoing discussion we may conclude that criminal
negligence may result from culpable omission to discharge a legal
duty imposed by contract, by relationship, or by the voluntary act of
taking charge; and that criminality results where there is a culpable
failure to perform a duty imposed by law, such omission resulting
in injury to, or death of, another. No criminal intent is necessary,
as has been exhibited by the cases cited and discussed, if all the five
elements as detailed in a previous paragraph are present making the
omission culpable.3 4 Finally, it is submitted that the "reasonable
man" test talked about so much in tort law is applicable to criminal
omissions of a legal duty, and that culpable negligence in criminal law
has a marked similarity to, or is equivalent to, gross negligence in
torts.
TowN HALL.
*IState v. Staples, 126 Minn. 396, 148 N. W. 283 (1914); Gibson
v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 360, 50 S. W. 532 (1899); State v. Barnes,
141 Tenn. 469, 212 S. W. 100 (1919); Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa.
Cr. C. 56, 65 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 88 (1916).
STerritory v. Manton, 8 Montana 95, 19 Pac. 387 (1888).
State v. Smith, 65 Me. 257, - Atl. - (1876).
Miller, op. cit. supra, note 21.
